苏珊·哈克  著 刘静坤，丁丽玮  译

【摘 要】 审判过程并非仅仅是为了“查明真相”。自从美国的法律系统开始使用科学证人以来，法律领域就面临着混乱的局面。自从 Frye 规则到 Daubert 标准再到 Kumho Tire 标准，乃至发展为修改后的《联邦证据规则》702 条，尽管法律系统经历了上述诸多努力，人们仍然不会相信法律系统能够从科学信息中获得预期的收益。科学主张和理论或真或假，它们的真或假是一个客观的问题。法律裁决可以断定法律真理为真，也可以断定“所谓的科学真理”为真。 只有科学命题所描述的自然界现象和事件的性质———而非有关证据可靠性的法律裁决，也非法庭上的论证和交叉询问———能够证明真的科学命题为真，证明假的科学命题为假。

【关键词】 真相；科学；法律；证据规则

【中图分类号】 D90-05

【文献标识码】 A

【文章编号】 1674-1226（2008）05-0607-15

Of Truth, in Science and in Law.Susan Haack,Miami University,USA;Translated by Liu Jingkun¹, Ding Liwei²  1.The Supreme People′s Court,Beijing 100745;2.Tsinghua Law School, Beijing 100871

【Abstract】 The basic purpose of a trial is not merely the determination of truth. Ever since the American legal system began to call on scientific witnesses, it seems like a legal tangle. From Frye to Daubert to Kumho Tire to the revised Federal Rules of Evidence，even after all these legal efforts, no one believes that the legal system always gets the most or the best scientific information that, ideally, it might. So scientific claims and theories are(normally) either true or false, and their truth or falsity is (normally) an objective matter. Legal truths are made true by legal decisions; and so, sometimes, are scientific “truths.” But it is the character of phenomena and events in the world that scientific propositions describe—not legal decisions about evidentiary reliability, and not arguments and cross-examination in court—that make true scientific propositions true, and false scientific propositions false.

【Key words】 Truth, Science, Law, Rules of evidence