［美］罗纳德·J·艾伦 ［美］迈克尔·S·帕尔多 著 熊晓彪 郑凯心 译 张保生 校

【摘 要】法学界有一种使用（也许是过度使用）“范式转型”（paradigm shift）的倾向，但其方式却与托马斯·库恩（Thomas Kuhn）的著名描述过程大相径庭。然而，在证据法领域，一种非常类似于库恩意义上的范式转型现象正在发生。它虽未达到从牛顿到爱因斯坦物理学或其他科学结构转型那样的规模，但对司法证明的最佳理解正在从概率主义向解释主义转型。几百年来，审判中的证明都被假定为概率性的。这种假定自从 1968 年约翰·卡普兰（John Kaplan）的开拓性文章发表以来，受到了学术界的持续关注与支持。这是一篇以概率来解释司法证明几乎所有方面的文献，从相关性的基本性质到信息处理，再到关于事实的最终裁决。虽然概率主义很快就成为主流范式，但从乔纳森·科恩（L. Jonathan Cohen）对特定证明悖论（proof paradoxes）的论证开始，一些分析上的困难很早就被发现了（用库恩的话说，就是“异常”或“刺激物”）。罗纳德 · 艾伦（Ronald Allen）对此进行了拓展，他还论证了贝叶斯推理与审判的不相容，并提出了一种分析性替代方法。随之，主流范式的捍卫者炮制了大量文献，试图通过解释来消除那些异常现象，或者守护概率范式免受潜在的侵蚀影响（事实上，库恩在一个非常小的范围内关于科学范式转型的解释和预见正是如此）。在过去二十年里，这些异常现象已变得令人烦恼到不能再忽略它的程度，而与之竞争的解释性推论（相对似真性理论）范式的优势，已变得如此具有说服力而不容忽视。因此，该领域正在经历这种范式转型。在此，我们对相对似真性理论以及概率范式的改进做了总结。正如库恩所指出的，当范式转变时并非所有人都赞同，总是有坚守者、反对者和异议者。最近有三篇主要论证相对似真性不足的论文发表。我们对其进行了分析，论证了他们的反对意见不是不合时宜就是徒劳的，从而奠定了相对似真性作为司法证明之最佳解释的基础。有趣的是，在我们所讨论的三种批评意见中，竟有两种实际上同意概率范式存在着不足（他们提供了替代方案）。第三种批评意见则承认，解释主义可能提供了一种关于司法证明的更佳进路，却试图鉴于一种特定的分析困难，复兴对证明责任的概率解释（即将证明责任适用于犯罪、民事诉求及辩护的单一因素而非当事人的完整案情，从而导致了合取难题的出现）。在分析我们的批评者所提出的替代性主张时，我们论证了他们的观点每一种都并不比相对似真性提供了更好的解释。

【关键词】证据；证明；认识论；概率；最佳解释推论

【中图分类号】D915.13

【文献标识码】A

【文章编号】1674-1226（2020）04-0433-50

Relative plausibility and its critics. Ronald J Allen¹, Michael S Pardo².Translated by Xiong Xiaobiao³,Zheng Kaixin³, Zhang Baosheng⁴.1.Northwestern University; 2.University of Alabama School of Law; 3.Jilin universityjudicial civilization Collaborative Innovation Center; 4. Institute of Evidence Law and Forensic Science, China University of Political Science and Law (CUPL), Beijing, 100088.

【Abstract】Within legal scholarship there is a tendency to use (perhaps overuse) “paradigm shift” in ways far removed from the process famously described by Thomas Kuhn. Within the field of evidence,however, a phenomenon very similar to a paradigm shift, in the Kuhnian sense, is occurring. Although not on the scale of the transformation from Newtonian to Einsteinian physics or other tectonic shifts in science, the best understanding of juridical proof is shifting from probabilism to explanationism. For literally hundreds of years, proof at trial was assumed to be probabilistic. This assumption was given sustained scholarly attention and support beginning with the 1968 publication of John Kaplan’s path-breaking article that generated a rich literature explaining virtually all aspects of juridical proof as probabilistic, from the basic nature of relevancy through the processing of information to the final decision about the facts.Although probabilism quickly became the dominant paradigm,some analytical difficulties were detected quite early (“anomalies” or “irritants” in the words of Kuhn), beginning with L.Jonathan Cohen’s demonstration of certain proof paradoxes. These were extended by Ronald Allen, who also demonstrated the incompatibility of Bayesian reasoning with trials and proposed an analytical alternative. Again a complex literature ensued with the defenders of the dominant paradigm attempting to explain away the anomalies or to shield the probabilistic paradigm from their potentially corrosive effects (in what in fact on a very small scale is precisely what Kuhn explained and predicted with respect to paradigm shifts in science). Over the last two decades, these anomalies have become too irritating to ignore, and the strengths of the competing paradigm involving explanatory inferences (referred to as the relative plausibility theory) have become too persuasive to dismiss. Thus the paradigm shift that the field is now experiencing.We provide here a summary of the relative plausibility theory and its improvement on the probabilistic paradigm. As Kuhn noted, not everybody gets on board when paradigms shift; there are holdouts, dissenters, and objectors. Three major efforts to demonstrate the inadequacies of relative plausibility have recently been published. We analyze them here to demonstrate that their objections are either misplaced or unavailing, leaving relative plausibility as the best explanation of juridical proof. It is interesting to note that two of the three critiques that we discuss actually agree on the inadequacies of the probabilistic paradigm (they provide alternatives). The third concedes that explanationism may provide a better overall account of juridical proof but tries to resuscitate a probabilistic interpretation of burdens of proof in light of one particular analytical difficulty (i.e., the conjunction problem, which arises from the fact that proof burdens apply to the individual elements of crimes, civil claims,and defenses rather than a party’s case as a whole). In analyzing the alternative positions proposed by our critics,we demonstrate that their accounts each fail to provide a better explanation than relative plausibility.

【Key Words】evidence, proof, epistemology, probability, inference to the best explanation